We study a class of games featuring payo¤ functions being parabolic cylinders where best reply functions are orthogonal and therefore the pure-strategy non-cooperative solution is attained as a Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies. We prove that the resulting threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion on the Pareto frontier is stable in the in…nite supergames is independent of the number of players. This holds irrespective of whether punishment is based on in…nite Nash reversion or one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy. We outline two examples stemming from economic theory and one from international relations.
Introduction
In the theory of non-cooperative games, we are accustomed to think that in…nite supergames with discounting may allow players to generate in…nitely many equilibria which are Pareto-superior to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game. This is the essential message of generations of folk theorems (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, ch. 5) . Moreover, the acquired wisdom holds that the stability of implicitly collusive paths is monotonically decreasing in the number of players, the reason for this being that for any given size of the pie to be split among players, the individual slice is itself monotonically decreasing in the number of diners.
We shall show that this property is engendered by the presence of multiplicative e¤ects among players'strategic variables, in the absence of which the stability criterion is indeed a pure number. To do so, we construct a payo¤ function which takes the shape of a parabolic cylinder producing orthogonal best reply functions, thereby identifying a class of non-cooperative games which are solvable in dominant strategies. Then, we characterize some properties of such payo¤ function, to be used to investigate the outcome of the in…nite supergame based on (i) in…nite Nash reversion (Friedman, 1971) or (ii) one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments (Abreu, 1986) , alternatively.
By doing so, we prove rather surprising results, namely, that the critical threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion along the Pareto frontier is stable is independent of the number of players in both cases (i-ii); and under (i) such threshold is twice as high as under (ii).
The straightforward implication of our results is that relying upon the number of players to assess the stability of the Pareto-e¢ cient outcome may not be a sound proposal. For example, if the game describes oligopolistic interaction, an antitrust agency could be tempted to think that increasing the number of …rms in the industry may make collusion less likely. Our result imply that this implication is not systematically reliable.
To corroborate the general analysis (Section 2), which is carried out with no reference to any speci…c …eld of social sciences, we outline two examples belonging to the theory of the …rm (Section 3) and the intersection between economic geography and the theory of industrial organization (Section 4), and one emerging from the theory of international relation (Section 5). Concluding remarks are in Section 6.
The general case
Consider a supergame over discrete time t = 0; 1; 2; :::1; played by a …nite set N = (2; 3; :::n) of agents. Each player i controls a single variable x i 2 R.
Each stage game is played noncooperatively under complete, symmetric and imperfect information. All players discount the future at a common and time-invariant discount factor 2 (0; 1). In the whole paper, we con…ne our attention to pure strategies.
Let the objective function of the i-th player be
where f ; ; ; "g is a vector of real parameters. Depending on the sign of , player i faces either a maximum or a minimum problem. We will come back later to the sign of f ; ; "g.
Note that v i is the equation of a parabolic cylinder in R n , whose canonical
In our case, the parabolic cylinder is translated by x i + ".
An interesting property of (1) will become relevant in the ensuing analysis.
From the Theorema Egregium of Gauss (1827), we know that the Gaussian curvature of any given surface does not modify by bending the surface itself without stretching it. That is, the Gaussian curvature is determined by measuring angles, distances and their rates on the surface itself, with no reference whatsoever to the speci…c way in which the surface is embedded in the 3D Euclidean space. Hence, the Gaussian curvature is an intrinsic invariant property of a surface. In Gauss'own words:
"Si super…cies curva in quamcumque aliam super…ciem explicatur, mensura curvaturae in singulis punctis invariata manet."
The Gaussian curvature K of a surface f (x i ; x j ) is de…ned as the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the function f (x i ; x j ) itself:
If f ( ) is a cylinder, then K = 0, because it can be ‡attened onto a plane whose Gaussian curvature is zero. This property obviously extends to the speci…c case in which f ( ) is a parabolic cylinder, as (1).
The Gaussian curvature is no longer nil in presence of a multiplicative e¤ect between x i and x j or when f ( ) is non-linear in at least one of the n 1 x j 's.
In our model, since v i is additively separable w.r.t. the strategic variables of all players, the extremal of v i is in correspondence of
for any vector of x j 's. This amounts to saying that reaction functions are orthogonal to each other. At x i ; the maximum or minimum of v i is
for any vector of x j 's. 
which implies the following:
Lemma 1 If the objective function of player i is a parabolic cylinder, then,
for any x i , the e¤ect of a change in any x j on v i ; for all j 6 = i; is (a) constant and (b) independent of n.
Notice that properties (a-b) do not generally hold true. For instance, if
where X i is the vector of all x j ; j 6 = i;
and this, combined with the fact that the best reply function of i is x i = P j6 =i x j " = (2 ) ; makes @f i (x i ; X i ) =@x j dependent on n. This is because (6) generates a multiplicative e¤ect between x i and all of the x j 's, which reveals, as noted above, that (6) is not a parabolic cylinder and therefore its Gaussian curvature is not nil. This example illustrates that, when the best replies are not orthogonal, each element of the gradient rv i being a function of the numerosity of players, Lemma 1 stops holding true.
A direct implication of Lemma 1 is: 2 Proposition 2 For any vector of pure strategies (x i ; x j = x i + (n 1) k`) ; with`= 1; 2; 3;
and therefore
Proof. Suppose player i picks any x i (which, in general, does not coincide with the best reply x , although it may). Then, imagine all players j 6 = i
Notice that x j = x i + (n 1) k covers the whole strategy space over the real axis, for any player j 6 = i, by tuning
For any triple k 1 6 = k 2 6 = k 3 ; we can de…ne the corresponding payo¤s to player i as v i (x i ; x i + (n 1) k`) with`= 1; 2; 3; respectively. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1 , where x i < x :
Now observe that the ratios
are both independent of the number of players.
One might wonder about the interest of the above analysis. The answer lies in the understanding of ih and its partial derivative w.r.t. the number of players. The interpretation becomes evident as soon as one thinks back to the critical threshold of the discount factor above which implicit collusion becomes sustainable in an in…nitely repeated game in which the time-invariant payo¤ function takes the form speci…ed in (1).
To see this, consider the case in which player i sticks to his best reply, i.e.,
. If all other players choose k = 0 and thus play
; the resulting outcome is the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, yielding the symmetric payo¤
where N stands for Nash. If instead all players collude along the frontier of the collective payo¤ V = P n i=1 v i , the symmetric strategy optimising V is
where C mnemonics for collusion. The corresponding payo¤ is
The unilateral deviation from the collusive outcome takes place along (3) and
in which D stands for deviation.
univocally solves v i (x ; x j ) = v C : That is, b x is the strategy that each of the n 1 rivals should play in order to grant to player i the same payo¤ as under collusion when player i himself sticks to his best reply. Using x ; x C and b x;
one can easily see that
which is a special case of the situation illustrated in Proposition 2, where Now it is appropriate to recollect the rules of a supergame over an in…nite horizon relying on Friedman's (1971) grim trigger strategies, according to which any deviation from the collusive path is followed by the in…nite Nash reversion. This implies that collusion is stable i¤
where subscript F mnemonics for Friedman. Therefore, if the triple of values chosen for k is k 1 = 0; k 2 = k C ; k 3 = b k ; then the ratio i3 is nothing but F ; i.e., the critical level of the discount factor under a punishment based on the in…nite Nash reversion.
Alternatively, if one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments (also termed as optimal punishments) are used, 3 as in Abreu (1986) , the perpetual stability of the collusive path is ensured i¤
while the incentive compatibility constraint that must be satis…ed in order for players to simultaneously adopt the optimal punishment is
where v OP is the payo¤ resulting from the symmetric adoption of the optimal punishment x OP and v D x OP is the payo¤ produced by the optimal unilateral deviation x against the punishment. The system of inequalities (18-19) has to be solved w.r.t. the unknowns and x OP , yielding 3 We con…ne ourselves to single-period optimal punishments. For the analysis of multiperiod optimal punishments, see Lambertini and Sasaki (2002) . 4 There exists a third constraint regarding the non-negativity of the continuation payo¤. This must be satis…ed to ensure that players do not quit the supergame after an initial deviation from collusion. We will explicitly take into account this constraint in the remainder of the paper.
where subscript A stands for Abreu, and
Accordingly, i2 is A , i.e., the lowest level of the discount factor stabilising collusion under optimal one-shot punishments if the triple of values of k is
The interpretation of the property whereby @ ih =@n = 0; as from Proposition 2, is therefore that in supergames where the payo¤ function is a parabolic cylinder, collusive stability does not depend on the number of players, contrary to the acquired wisdom on the basis of which we are accustomed to think that enlarging a cartel size amounts to destabilising it. and N P along the 45 line in Figure 3 have the same length, and therefore CN=CP = N P=CP = 1=2; which explains why F = 2 A . Properties (15) and k OP = k C follow from any cylinder (including a parabolic one) being broadly de…ned in di¤erential geometry as any ruled surface spanned by a parametric family of parallel lines.
The foregoing discussion boils down to the following:
Proposition 3 If the payo¤ function is a parabolic cylinder, then the stability of implicit collusion in a supergame over an in…nite horizon is independent of the number of players, under both Nash and optimal punishments. Moreover, the critical discount factor generated by the in…nite Nash reversion is twice as high as that generated by one-shot stick-and-carrot punishments.
This prompts for an additional question, about the relevance of the class of games featuring this property. We are about to provide three such examples by borrowing well established models from the theory of the …rm, from a terrain where industrial organization and economic geography overlap, and international relations. In all of these models, players act non cooperatively over an in…nite time horizon.
Team production
As for the stage game, here we use a version of the model by Holmström (1982) , where the focus is the arising of moral hazard in teams. A set of n agents is employed in a …rm whose output q is obtained through the pro-
p e i ; where e i 0 is agent i's e¤ort and z is a positive parameter. Each agent chooses e i to maximise utility u i = w i ce i ;
where w i 0 is wage and c is a positive parameter. The shape of u i reveals constant work-aversion. The sharing rule is decided by the principal, unable to observe each individual e¤ort. Hence, the principal sets w i = q=n for all 3 , where C and P may exchange positions depending on the sign of = .
> 0; and w i = 0 otherwise (as in Groves, 1973) . If indeed w i = q=n; the individual utility writes
which is a a parabolic cylinder corresponding to (1), if one rede…nes x i = p e i : However, here the non-negativity of e¤orts entails that we con…ne our attention to real and positive portion of the cylinder. Moreover, looking back at (1), = c; = z=n and = " = 0.
The Nash equilibrium of the stage game is delivered by the solution of the following system of …rst order conditions (FOCs):
The associated output is q N = z 2 = (2c).
In the context of this model, the collusive outcome is the Pareto-e¢ cient solution, which is attained by imposing the a priori symmetry condition upon e¤orts, e i = e for all i; and then maximising the generic u i w.r.t. e. Doing so,
one obtains e C = z 2 = (4c 2 ) ; yielding u C = z 2 = (4c). The unilateral deviation from e C takes place along the best reply (22), and is e D = e : The resulting
If deviation is deterred via the in…nite Nash reversion as in Friedman (1971), the Pareto-e¢ cient outcome is stable i¤
If instead the one-shot stick-and-carrot strategy is adopted, the utility level in the punishment period is u OP = z p e OP ce OP ; while the utility generated by a unilateral deviation from the optimal punishment is
Solving the inequalities corresponding to (18-19), one obtains A = 1=4 and
As for the third constraint, the discounted ‡ow of payo¤s accruing to each player from the symmetric punishment phase to doomsday must be non-negative so as to prevent exit. That is,
Using e C and the lower bound of e OP ; we can simplify the l.h.s. of (25) as
; which is strictly positive for all 2 (0; 1) and all n 2. Hence, in this example, F = 2 A = 1=2; as required by Proposition 3.
Our reformulation of Holmström's (1982) model illustrates that (i) the
Pareto-e¢ cient outcome can be sustained forever without implementing the Groves mechanism, provided agents are su¢ ciently patient; and (ii) the critical threshold of the discount factor is independent of the team size.
Agglomeration, externalities and collusion
The acquired wisdom from both the IO literature (Tirole, 1988, pp. 247-48) and policy reports (Ivaldi et al., 2003) is that high market concentration is a facilitating factor for (tacit as well as explicit) collusion. In addition to coordination being likely more di¢ cult in larger groups, the intuition that the incentive to collusion shrinks with too many competitors is fairly simple:
"Since …rms must share the collusive pro…t, as the number of …rms increases each …rm gets a lower share of the pie. This has two implications.
First, the gain from deviating increases for each …rm since, by undercutting the collusive price, a …rm can steal market shares from all its competitors; that is, having a smaller share each …rm would gain more from capturing the entire market. Second, for each …rm the long-term bene…t of maintaining collusion is reduced, precisely because it gets a smaller share of the collusive pro…t. Thus the short-run gain from deviation increases, while at the same time the long-run bene…t of maintaining collusion is reduced. It is thus more di¢ cult to prevent …rms from deviating." (Ivaldi et al., 2003, p. 12) The source of this property is the externality engendered by a negatively sloped demand function, as it transpires from the above quotation. Hence, a priori, one might be induced to conjecture that, if market price is exogenously given for some reasons, this property stops holding and collusion becomes altogether impossible. We are about to show that such conjecture may be falsi…ed if an industry features some other admissible type of externality.
Consider n identical …rms selling a homogeneous good whose market price p > 0 is exogenous, because of either a perfectly competitive market or regulatory intervention. Firm i's output is q i ; and production involves total costs C i = c q 
whereby the individually optimal collusive output is
and the corresponding share of cartel pro…ts is
If the supergame relies on Friedman's (1971) grim trigger strategies, the critical level of the discount factor is
If instead one-shot stick-and-carrot punishment is used, one has to solve the following system of inequalities:
w.r.t. and q OP ; so as to obtain A = 1=4 and q
0 for all b 2 (0; 1= (n 1)) since the pro…t margin on the …rst unit being produced is p c; which must be positive.
The continuation payo¤ is
and it must be non-negative to prevent …rms to quit the supergame after a deviation from the collusive path. A su¢ cient condition for the expression on the r.h.s. of (31) to be positive is
which is certainly true because the above inequality is met by all
where p= [c (n 1)] > 1= (n 1) because p > c; as we already know.
As anticipated above, the presence of an externality makes collusive stability independent of cartel size. Therefore, an antitrust authority should keep an eye on these phenomena since agglomeration -if accompanied by cost-reducing externalities traditionally associated with industrial districtsmight indeed neutralize the usual destabilising e¤ect of increasing industry fragmentation on implicitly collusive behaviour.
Arms race vs disarmament
We consider a supergame among n 2 countries, each of them endowed with a given military capacity yielding a utility level u 0. The best reply function is a = 1=b; yielding u N = u (2n 3) = (2b) :
The Pareto-e¢ cient strategy vector solving
is identi…ed by a i = a C = (2 n) =b for all i. Note that a C 0 for all n 2. That is, the collective agreement along the Pareto frontier entails maintaining the status quo unaltered if there are only two powers, or e¤ective disarmament if there are more. The associated utility is u C = u + (n 2) 2 = (2b) > u N . Deviating unilaterally from a C and playing 6 The literature on arms races is too long to be exhaustively accounted for here. See 
Using grim trigger strategies, the resulting critical threshold of the discount factor is again F = 1=2:
To evaluate the outcome of the supergame under the one-shot stick-andcarrot punishment, one has to de…ne the punishment payo¤:
and the utility generated by a unilateral deviation from the punishment along a :
Then, solving u 
It is noteworthy that the optimal one-shot punishment describes an intense arms race taking place in a single period. Moreover, con…rming the property highlighted in Section 2, a a C = (n 1) =b = a OP a .
Concluding remarks
We have shown that when payo¤ functions are parabolic cylinders, the stability of implicit collusion does not depend on the number of players. Fairly natural applications of our results extend to many issues in industrial economics and have relevant implications for antitrust authorities. Additionally, our frame may accomodate issues pertaining to international relations and possibly also others in di¤erent …elds of social sciences, with equally relevant implications.
